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Article 1

Letters ...
Help Sought
To the Editor:
Two of us physicians work in a
rural hospital near Quezaltenango City
in Guatemala, Central America. We
heard about your association from
reading Linacre Quarterly, an excellent
review for ethics in medical practice.
We serve an indigenous population
and we hope you might send us, if
possible, aid for improving our health
service. This aid can be surgical or labora tory equipment, medicines and
drugs, or recent articles and books
referring to infectious diseases, tropical medicine, malnutrition, epidemiology or public health.
---ThankYou. God bless yo u .
- Dr. Edgar Domingues
Sanatorio Pasac I
Cantel, Quezaltenango
Guatemala, Central America

Editor's Note: We suggest that anyone
able to respond to this plea send medicine or supplies directly to Doctor
Domingues at the address given.

Re: Cerebral Death
To the Editor:
The rather odd fact is that certain
sections of the medical and legal professions et al. have taken it upon themselves to manufacture a new type of
death which goes by the name of
"brain death" and which is utterly different from the somatic death which
has been recognized throughout the
ages. This innovation is not based
upon any new discovery with regard to
death but is of much more ordinary
parentage and owes its being to
nothing more substantial than present
fancy.
Up until about 20 years ago, when
a person's heart stopped beating for
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more than a few minutes, he was dead.
He was dead then because there was,
then, no means of substituting for the
function of the heart. Life was
thought to be dependent upon the
function of the heart. Understandably
enough it was not recognized then that
it was not the heart that was importan t . but the circulation. Once it
became possible to substitute mechanical apparatus for the function of the
heart, the definition of death, then
extant, became outmoded.
Life is an active process, dependent
upon circulation for it is circulation
which binds the person into one being,
that unites the body in a whole. When
circulation ceases, the body disappears. It has been replaced by a disintegrated collection of separate
organs. That is death: that lack of integration. Absence of brain function is
not death. If it were, the child who is
conceived would be conceived "dead."
But, often, the woman who has conceived the child is desperately afraid of
it. She would not be afraid of a dead
child. No! The newly conceived child
is very much alive and yet that child
has no brain function as yet.
There is an extremely significant
difference between the brain and circulation. The former is fixed and stationary and is only an organ of the
child while circulation is in constant
movement and life is that movement.
When that movement ceases for a significant period of time, so does life
cease. The presence or absence of
cerebral function may determine
whether further treatment is warranted; it does not determine whether
the child is alive or dead. That obvious
fact appears to have escaped attention.
The heart is an organ even as the brain
is an organ, but neither the one nor
the other is the organ of life. A person
with no brain function is unconscious,
but he is not dead. But let there be no
circulation for more than a few minutes (when the body is at normal
temperatures) and he is dead forever.
It is circulation which brings into
functional unity the various parts of
the living body. It is the absence of
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circulation which is corruption, which
is death.
The medical and legal fraternities in
their wisdom or lack of it, have overlooked that obvious fact and decided
to manufacture a new form of death
- a form in which the person does
not die but instead is maintained in a
perpetual state of unconsciousness for
whatever purposes his attendants have
in mind.
Until relatively recently, it was
thought that if a patient were treated
in a hospital, that treatment was given
for his benefit and for his alone. Sheila
Taub, writing in Connecticut Medicine
("Brain Death: A Re-Evaluation of the
Harvard Criteria," vol. 45, no. 9
[Sept., 1981]) cites the following
three reasons for treating the irreversibly unconscious patient.
(1) The patient's organs become
available for transplantation while
they are still in the optimum condition.
(2) The patient's relatives are
spared the emotional and financial
burdens of treating the patient as if he
or she were still alive for several additional weeks when death is in evitable.
(3) Society is spared the use of
scarce and expensive resources which
can more profitably be used on other
patients.
In other words, in no way will the
patient be the beneficiary of the treatment he is receiving . He has been conveniently elim inated by the definition
of his own death. Now the whole purpose of brain death legislation becomes obvious. It wou ld be a simple
matter to discontinue the obviously
futile treatment if that were the object
of the exercise . But it is not. The
object is to obtain the patient's organs
before h e is properly finished with
them because they "ca n , more profitably, be used on other patien ts."
If the declaration of "brain death"
were only the means by which the
termination of treatment cou ld be
brought about, this would not matter
too much, for the treatment of the
cerebrally dead is an exercise in
futility. But that is not the en d of
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brain death legislation; it is only the
beginning, for once it is enacted it will
become possible to obtain living
bodies in a better and better state of
preserva tion by declaring them" dead"
at an earlier and earlier stage of their
terminal illness.
What do a few residual reflexes
matter if the patient can neither think
or feel? Why not declare him "dead"
now and put him on life support? The
finding of "brain death" is not a conclusion drawn from an examination of
the patient; it is a predicate of the
examination. That it has no real existence is evident from the fact that the
time of death can be moved about at
will; it is not fixed by the nature of
things. Thus the "brain dead" person
is given two examinations about 24
hours apart. If his condition is
unchanged between them, he will be
declared to have died before the first.
But the very fact that he was given
two examinations proves conclusively
that it was not certain that he was
dead at the time of the first and it
proves also that the physician cannot
distinguish between a live person and a
dead one. Who, in his right mind,
would re-examine a person whom he
knew to be dead already?
The concept of "brain death" is
unbelievably naive. It is the product of
the expert mind and it receives slavish
acceptance because that is so. The general practitioner is only too conversant
with the meaning of "dead" from his
own practical experience. He would
not think to question its meaning. The
specialist is too far removed from the
realities of life and death to come to
grips with them . To him, "dead" does
not denote the existential condition of
a person, but the availability of his still
living body for transplant material or
experimentation. The opportunity to
experiment on the living body of the
"dead" person is too good to be
missed.
Let us try to see what t h e fu ture
holds if "brain death" legislation is
enacted. If nothing e lse, it will be a
heyday for the legal profession.
At the moment, when a patient is
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close to death , all treatment other
than that aimed at making him as com fortable as possible , even at the
expense of rendering him unconscious,
is abandoned . Any hope of curative
treatment has long since been lost.
But in the event that the actual
tim e of death becomes very important
and it will become imp ortant from
time to time, the whole situation
w h i c h previously existed, will be
altered. The poor patient is thrust into
the impersonal and uncaring maw of
scientism.
In all circumstances, except, perhaps , brain death, the person and his
brain die together. In no circumstance
does the person die first and his brain
die afterwards. If brain death legislation is enacted, there will be an
implied duty on the physician to continue with supportive therapy at least
until death. This will be so in all
instances of death. No patient may be
allowed to die without the fear that
the physician who so allowed him will
be found derelict in his duty to the
patient. Once one physician has been

successfully sued for not having used
every weapon in his armamentarium to
keep his patient alive, every physician
will be afraid to discontinue treatment, however futile it may be. In the
Quinlan case, the court ruled, "He (the
physician) must do all in his human
power to favour life against death."
"All." There is no choice. There are no
exceptions.
The fact is that the decision as to
whether further medical treatment is
medically warranted can be made,
reasonably, only by a person who is an
expert in the practice of medicine, not
by the court and not by both. What
the court has failed to realize is that
the physician is obliged to care for the
patient's health, not his life. If the
court would have it otherwise, then
the court should be burdened with the
problem of means; of how to care for
the patient's life other than by caring
for his health .
Please excuse the length.
- Colin P. Harrison, M.B., B.S.
Vancouver, B.C_

Are You Moving?
If the next issue of this journal should be delivered to a different address, please advise AT ONCE. The return postage
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and
more costly. Your cooperation in keeping us up-to-date with
your address will be most helpful.

November, 1982

293

